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1 INTRODUCTION
The emergence and inter-play of cooperation versus competition
in groups of individuals has been widely studied, for example using
game-theoretic models of eusocial insects [11], [1] experimental
evolution in bacterium [5], and agent-based models of societal insti-
tutions [8]. Game theory models have been demonstrated as indis-
pensable analytical tools to complement our understanding of the
emergence and social mechanics of natural phenomena such as co-
operation and competition. For example, game theory models have
supported the supposition that cooperation between individuals
and competition between groups are critical factors in cultural evo-
lution in human societies [2]. However, such game theory models
are ultimately limited by their own abstractions and lack consider-
ation for the role of complex phenomena such as evolutionary and
environmental change in shaping emergent social phenomena.
Agent-Based Models (ABMs) are well established as complemen-
tary bottom-up computational tools [15] for studying the impact
of specific environmental and evolutionary conditions on emer-
gent social phenomena such as cooperation and competition [3],
as well as for generating empirical data to support game theory
model predictions [13]. This study uses an ABM to support or refute
predictions elicited by game theoretic models on the interplay of ge-
netic relatedness, cooperation and competition within and between
groups of individuals (agents) [11], [1]. Specifically, we empirically
test the tug-of-war game theory hypothesis that cooperation in
eusocial insect colonies is driven by the dynamics of within-group
cooperation and between-group competition [16] rather than ge-
netic relatedness [4]. That is, increased between-group competition
leads to more within-group cooperation and increased group fitness,
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regardless of genetic relatedness. This study uses an ABM imple-
mentation of previous tug-of-war game-theoretic models [11], [1],
though experimental parameters (table 1) tested differ compared
to those in counterpart analytical models [11], [1]. We evolve co-
operative versus competitive behavior (resources shared versus not
shared) in resource gathering agents that move about a 2D toroidal
environment. We test the impact of three resource distributions on
evolving cooperative behavior and agent genetic relatedness.
2 METHODS
Each simulation initialized 1000 agents in random positions with
patchy or uniform resource distributions (100 or 1000 patches, re-
spectively). Resource density was highest at a patch’s center and
the total resource amount was 10000 units for each resource dis-
tribution. Resources were gathered by agents occupying the same
coordinates and replenished at 1.0 unit per simulation iteration.
Each agent was initialized with random genotypes encoding a feed-
forward Artificial Neural Network (ANN) controller. Genetic relat-
edness thus changed as a function of evolving agent genotypes. All
agents were initialized with a maximum energy (fitness) of 100 units
(table 1). Agents consumed energy via moving and reproducing
and increased energy via consuming gathered resources.
Agents moved in the environment using Brownian motion, at 10
units each iteration for a lifetime of 100 iterations. As resources
were gathered, an agent’s cooperative versus competitive behavior
was determined by its ANN output: [0.0, 1.0]. An output of 0.0
indicated no cooperation and 1.0 indicates maximal cooperation.
Each simulation was an evolutionary run of 100000 iterations. Each
iteration, all agents concurrently moved, gathered resources at their
environment coordinates, output cooperative versus competitive
behavior, and reproduced if possible. Selection, recombination and
mutation operators were applied per iteration for any two agents
were in a sharing radius (5 units) and genetic similarity distance
(0.1). Gathered resources were replenished at 1.0 unit per iteration
(table 1). Offspring agents were initialized at random locations.
Preliminary results partially supported tug-of-war game theory
since intensity of within-group cooperation (resources shared) and
between-group competition (resources not shared) increases over
evolutionary time. Specifically, we observed a bifurcation of the
agent population and cooperative behavior over evolutionary time
in the patchy environment, but not in the uniform environment
(table 1). Within the first group there was a high degree of coop-
eration and within the second group there was a high degree of
competition (figure 1, left). These groups were defined by agent
spatiality, with respect to resource distribution and richness, and
intense competition between the two groups. We hypothesize that
increased competition, the given spatial distribution and varying
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Figure 1: Left: Distribution of (normalized) agent outputs (cooperation vs competition) for the patchy environment. Center: Distribution of
agent groups on resource patches at iteration 1000 of a typical run. Blue indicates more competitive and red indicates more cooperative. Grey
indicates approximately equal cooperation versus competition. Right: Normalized population genetic relatedness over all iterations.
Parameter Value
Agent movement / distance / initial (maximum) energy Brownian motion / 10 units / 1000
Agent movement / Reproduction energy cost 0.1 / 0.1
Agent initial (maximum) energy / Population 100 / 1000
Agent controller / Connection weight range Feed-forward ANN / [0.0, 1.0]
Environment size / Sharing radius / Genetic similarity distance 1000 x 1000 units / 5 units / 0.1
Simulation iterations / Agent lifetime 100000 / 100
Total resources / Re-grow rate 10000 units / 1.0 per iteration
Resource distributions / Patches [Patchy, Uniform] / [Patchy : 100, Unif orm : 1000]
Table 1: Agent-Based Model Evolution and Simulation Parameters.
resource density, drove the two emergent competing groups. The
first group converged on rich resource patches and were largely co-
operative, whereas the second converged on relatively low richness
resource patches and were largely competitive (figure 1, center).
Figure 1 presents results for the patchy resource distribution
(100 patches), where the evolving population splits into cooperative
(average ANN output = 0.62) versus a relatively competitive group
(average ANN output= 0.35). However, in support of the tug-of-war
hypothesis [11], [1], average genetic relatedness did not increase
as cooperation increased (figure 1, right). Though, as predicted
by previous work [11], [1], average population fitness (energy)
increased over evolutionary time (not presented in figure 1).
These results are supported by related tug-of-war game theory
[14] work in ethology [12], sociology [7] and economics [6], that
similarly demonstrate the cooperation versus competition dynam-
ics can drive the evolution of cooperation. That is, such studies
predicted resource competition between groups greatly varies with
cooperation within and between groups, where cooperation makes
individuals more competitive for resources with other groups [10],
thus increasing overall group fitness. This study does not necessar-
ily preclude the role of genetic relatedness in evolving cooperative
versus competitive behavior, but rather notes that it as a supposed
complementary mechanism given specific environmental and evo-
lutionary conditions [9]. However, the exact relationship between
cooperation versus competition and evolutionary and environmen-
tal conditions remains the topic of ongoing research.
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